This paper examines a case of participatory local government budgeting in Japan. The paper demonstrates how cultural values interact with stages of the PB process (in our case coplanning or consultation phase of budgeting). We find three key stakeholders -assembly members, officials and citizens -have varying degree of participation in the budget process.
Introduction
national cultures and associate them with local government reforms such as NPM. For instance, studies on local government reforms in Japan have discussed the Japanese cultural context in relation to the adoption of Western-centric administration and local government reforms (Norton, 2007; Jun and Muto, 1995) . It is argued that the culture of collectivism has been a positive force in making successful reforms in the public sector of Japan (Eshima et al., 2001; Christensen, 2000) .
Nevertheless, cultural perspectives of the PB processes are relatively underresearched despite the calls for studying culture in public engagements (Flynn, 1998) . Irvin and Stansbury (2004) have argued that low and unrepresentative participation in the budget process may be indicative of a local culture characterised by citizens' undisputed acceptance of decisions undertaken by politicians. In a similar vein, some Japanese studies have reported challenges in getting individuals involved in the PB process (Fukushima, 2014; Nakatani, 2013) . Building on the above literature, this paper draws on Nakane's (1970) work 4 to offer some understanding of the challenges of PB processes in Japanese local government.
Vertical society -the Japanese way
Nakane's main focus was to understand Japanese society by examining the Japanese individual, group formation, and the relationships between group and individual and between groups. These relationships have serious implications on how participation occurs at the level of organisation and beyond. We have also employed recent studies on Japanese culture and society (Abe, 1995; Yamamoto, 1983; Kokami, 2009; Benedict, 1988; Curtis, 1999; Norton, 2007; Jun and Muto, 1995; van Wolferen, 1989) to complement Nakane's work. Nakane (1970) employed the concepts of "frame" ("ba" in Japanese) and "attribute" to capture how individuals see themselves in a group and in society at large. Frame indicates a location or belongingness, while attribute indicates profession or position. Identifying with a particular frame -a company, family or group, in other words, a collective -is considered to be the primary means of introduction. Social grouping in Japan is often constructed on the basis of a frame of group members (work place, village, etc.) with differing attributes. In order to sustain the group, coherence is crucial (Benedict, 1988) . In Nakane's view, this is done in two ways: by influencing members with a feeling of oneness or unity, and/or by creating an internal structure which ties individuals in the group to each other and thus (2009) has termed this kuki, in other words, a loosely coupled seken. Whatever the form seken takes, it still contributes to maintaining wa (harmony) within the group. van Wolferen's (1989: 196) comment on Japanese political power reflects this: "Japanese who disagree with the way in which the system works and who translate their discontent into political actions are considered subversive and looked upon as potential bomb-throwers".
In summary, the primacy of group over individuals, and of frame over attributes, group rivalries, and a deeply embedded Japanese consciousness of vertical relationships and oneness or wa have serious implications for how an organisation works. It is therefore interesting to examine how notions such as "participation" are implicated in the everyday lives of Japanese organisations. We examine these cultural norms in relation to the participation of citizens, bureaucrats and politicians in budgeting in the Kitakyushu case.
Research methods
Data for this case study were collected in 2014 over a span of one year, including multiple visits to the city council and the collection of documents. Important data sources for the identification of societal and cultural conditions included a preliminary review of the historical literature on Kitakyushu council, as well as the broader politico-economic and historical literature, such as analytical commentaries on Japan's political and economic situation and on local government in general. The review was conducted with specific reference to identifying the contexts surrounding local government. As a next step, in order to develop a better understanding of the structural conditions faced by the key actors in Kitakyushu, we collected media reports, annual statements and official documents relating to Kitakyushu.
Semi-structured interviews were one of most important sources of data contributing to an understanding of local government budgeting practices. Two authors (one native speaker)
were involved in facilitating the interviews. In total, we have spoken to 20 key stakeholders (in two stages), comprising 1 community leader (user of local government services), 1 ward official, 5 assembly members, 10 local government officials, and 1 professor (retired from the city government, with experience in the budgetary department). The second round of interviews at the local council was based on knowledge acquired from the first round. Two interviews were held, with the deputy mayor and a consultant working for local government reforms. Most interviews took place in the workplace, while some, especially those with politicians, were held in different locations, including one in a café.
The interviews were conducted mainly in Japanese, but translated immediately into English so that the non-Japanese author could follow them. Most interviews lasted around 60 minutes and were digitally recorded. Issues discussed during the interviews included: the nature of budgeting; the level of participation; the role of departments, politicians (assembly members), community members and the general public in influencing budget decisions; and the role of central government and civil servants. After completing each interview, the authors discussed the interview data and reflected on the findings to prepare themselves for the next interview. We presented our initial findings at two seminars attended by Japanese and UK local government researchers (60 participants). In addition to the interviews, one author attended an assembly meeting and watched assembly meetings on YouTube.
Having collected the data, the next stage was an analysis of the interviews in two forms: uncovering the cultural conditions, and determining the key actors' understanding of the practices. Our main aim was to make sense of the participation of citizens and assembly members in the budgeting process. In order to do this, we drew on Nakane's work on the vertical society and identified key themes to interpret the findings and agents' interpretations of budgeting practices. As we interpreted our findings, we constantly reworked our themes to capture deeper explanatory nuances of the data and to theorise the process of participation in budgeting.
Local government in Japan and Kitakyushu
Local government units in Japan provide a wide range of services to citizens, covering virtually everything except diplomacy, defense, currency and justice. Three fifths of the total tax revenues are spent at local government level employing three million people. Japan's local autonomy system has a two-tier system of local government: prefectures and municipalities. Prefectures are regional government units, and municipalities are basic local government units. The largest city within a municipality is often formally 'designated', and its power and functions are similar to those of prefectures in core areas such as social welfare, public health and urban planning. Kitakyushu, our case study, is a formally 'designated' city.
There are two governance structures at the heart of all local government units:
legislative and executive. The legislative branch is composed of representatives from local communities elected through adult suffrage, and makes decisions on the budget and local ordinances. It comprises the mayor or governor, plus assembly members, all of whom are directly elected by local residents for four years. The executive branch implements the policies decided by the legislative branch. The mayor is the head of both legislative and executive branches. The mayor/governor has the power of veto over the local assembly/city council, mirroring the powers of the US presidency.
[Insert Table One] The local government reforms in Japan since 1990 have significantly shaped local councils, including Kitakyushu council. In the context of economic decline compounded by an ever-increasing elderly population, a restriction of local council's spending power, cost cuts and outsourcing have been common to all councils during the last two decades, including Kitakyushu (Tanaka, 2010) . The economic decline has been reflected in the Table One. Revenue has been decreasing and almost 55 per cent of the total budget is under the local government's discretionary power.
Further scrutiny reveals that half of the unconditional revenues are in fact committed to fixed costs such as personnel, public assistance and the cost of public debt. In theory, the remainder is not fixed and may be influenced by stakeholders. Given the Mayoral election pledge and the claims of wider stakeholders' participation in Kitakyushu promoted by the local government associations and media, we have sought to examine the elements of participation in the budgeting process. The budget cycle comprises of three key phases in Kitakyushu. The interaction of key stakeholders including citizens, officials and assembly memebrs in each of these phases are discussed below. At the same time, the paper draws on Nakane's cultural framework to provide some explanations of those interactions.
Budgetary proposals: vertical negotiation
The annual budget -a part of a three-tier planning system: strategic, master and implementation plans -begins with the Mayor setting the principles for the year. The Mayor has overall authority to prioritise or ignore specific policies or projects set in strategic plans.
The budget desk representing the Mayor does not engage with any active consultation for setting out budget principles. This goes further as the interviews revealed. The budget desk often changes the allocations to the departments with little or no explanations. Departmental interviewees, accepting the power and authority of the budget desk, suggested that it is the 5 No evidence of pressures from central government or non governmental agencies to adopt the direct participtoin intiative. budget desk's remit to make final decisions. In preparing the departmental annual budgets, especially regarding the inclusion of new capital items, high priority is given to reflect the Mayoral election promises.
The budget desk has overall responsibility for the budget. For instance, in response to our question of whether the Mayor asks them to pursue specific projects and proposals, the finance officer in the budget desk responded: He does not need to tell us. We know what he wants and we must be prepared for this. Here, direct influence is unnecessary; as Nakane (1970) puts it, "junior must know what senior wants and work accordingly". The embedded vertical relationship does not require undue direct intervention.
Verticality is, in particular, reflected in the way negotiations are unfolded between the budget desk and departments. For instance, commenting on the cost-cutting policy, an executive director of the budget desk claimed that they do not anticipate much resistance to its cost-cutting announcements. The usual practice is to send a letter to each department detailing the percentage to be cut, together with the rules and principles of the budget, at the beginning of the budget cycle. The budget desk confirmed that there is some negotiation but little resistance from departments because they know this has to be done. One official from the budget desk said: We negotiate this with the managers, directors and even the chief executive of each department and ask them to adhere to the budget policy. If a compromise is not reached, it goes up to the deputy mayor in charge of the budget desk. Negotiation begins at managerial level and, if unresolved, goes up to director level, followed by head at the department level. Ultimately, the deputy mayor's decision is final. Although there may be some discomfort within departments, promoting oneness and maintaining "wa" is much more important (Nakane, 1970; Abe, 1995) .
Citizen participation: individual and group
The budget desk compiles budget proposals from departments and opens them up for citizens' comments. We find that a summary of budget proposals from all departments is made available on the city's websites, at the city's central office and in ward offices. Citizens are able to submit their opinions by e-mail, postal mail or fax, or bring them directly to the city council or ward office, giving their name and address. Seeking citizen engagments using a variety of ways are usual as depicted in the literature (Oh and Kim, 2016) . Nevertheless, the level of response received from citizens in Kitakyushu is very minimal. For instance, in the 2014 financial year, out of a population of more than a million in Kitakyushu city, only 71 people submitted 167 opinions. The number of opinions posted by citizens was even less in The nature of political participation (or lack thereof) is understandable if we see it in terms of Nakane's (1970) understanding of Japanese society. The Mayor is seen as the leader, and public disagreement in the assembly is not seen as good practice. In contrast, it is much easier to maintain oneness and vertical relationships by influencing the mayor's budget through council offices. Most assembly members are keen to maintain the political group's position, and strong group consciousness plays a pivotal role. There is no need for the whipping system of Western democracy. Members of a political group almost inevitably go along with the political position unless they resign from political parties. The impossibility of raising issues close to their hearts leads them to lobbying council offices before the budget proposal to the assembly.
Concluding remarks
To sum up, three key stakeholders -assembly members, officials and citizens -have varying degree of participation in the budget process. First, like many other cases in Japan, (JMRC, 2012; Sintomer et al., 2012; Nakatani, 2013) and Western countries (Ebdon and Franklin, 2006 ;), direct citizen participation has been limited and challenging. Nevertheless, we find local groups and associations do have some influence or some form of engagement with budgeting. Second, we also find that engagement between departments and the budget desk is vertically constituted. The budget desk, representing the Mayor, remains the powerful element of the budgetary process. Third, the assembly works as an official rubber stamp rather than presenting a counter-power to the Mayor. Assembly members work as lobbyists to influence the budget less publicly.
We have sought to understand how participation agendas interact with the Japanese way of doing things. Although the influence of cultural norms such as "being in seken" is waning in the Japanese society, the primacy of group over inividual is still manifested in the everyday lives of people (Norton, 2007; Christensen, 2000) . We therefore argue that Nakane's claims about vertical relationships in groups/organisations, maintaining or performing "wa" or oneness in the group, and the primacy of groups over individuals are useful in shedding light on the nature of participation. For instance, negotiations following hierarchy are an interesting example of superior (sempai) versus junior (kohai). Subordinates of the mayor and his offices working for the Mayor and trying to take on projects anticipating his wishes also reveal a classic case of vertical relationships -a form of internal organisational structure within the groups. The importance of maintaining social order through "wa" or oneness is reflected in the monologues of assembly meetings. Traditional engagement between departments and citizens is much more effective and still continues, even though public comments through websites are encouraged. Traditional department engagement with local leaders and associations allows for vertical relationships and group characteristics. We do not wish to claim all Japanese local government budgeting emanates exactly the same feature of verticality but the general patterns of interactions between and among key stakeholders in relation to budgeting process would perhaps be shaped by some form of verticality 6 .
This paper contributes to the public administration literature in several ways. First, the paper provides deeper explanations of how local cultural conditions interact with the PB process in general and in Japan in particular. In so doing, the paper contributes to the cultural studies on local government reforms and their implementations (Flynn, 1998; Kim 2017; Simmons, 2016; Linsley et al., 2016; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004) . This paper, in particular, drawing on Nakane's work, has demonstrated how the prevailing local cultrural conditions
give rise to a unique form of participation in the local government budgeting process.
Without denying the impact of economic crises, regulatory loopholes and institutional contexts (Barbera et al., 2016) , the paper argues that local cultural norms in Japan do not match the conditions required for wider citizen or political participation in the assembly.
Instead, departmental engagement with local associations and community leaders, and assembly members lobbying away from the wider public eye are consistent with local cultural conditions. Second, the paper offers a critique of unquestioning assumptions about the transfer of knowledge such as PB from one context to another and contributes to the wider debate on PB. We concur with the arguments that reforms may have unexpected consequences; cultural variations being an important variable (Christensen and Fan, 2016; Masujima, 2005) .
Researchers have already highlighted such risks ( Andrews and de Vries, 2007) , warning that, countries often do not have the necessary structural (material and cultural) conditions for intended participation. It might be argued that, in Japan, material conditions necessitating reforms should be similar to Asian nations. However, cultural conditions influencing reforms (be they are NPM or PB) are unique, not just to each country, but also to individual organisations within a single country (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011) . Appreciation of these unique cultural conditions is key to a better understanding and theorising of unintended consequences of local government reforms across countries. Thus, this paper suggests caution should be exercised in the wholesale adoption of such programmes.
Finally, we would call for further studies to detail the role of budgetray participation efforts in other Japanese local governments, as well as in different cultural contexts. Such a study of budget participation in other Japanese local governments may provide further insights into the verticality and its perpetuation at the time when the country is experiencing a flux in its socio-econiomic conditions (Norton, 2007; Christensen, 2000) . Cross-country research on budgetary participation should perhaps also be encouraged to shed light on the narrowness of local government refroms around the world, demonstrate cultural variations and raise cautions of unquestioning adoption of globlised reform ideas.
